- Devices and computers (which allow us to penetrate the digital realm in the first place)
- Digital resources (which attract us to it)
- Policies and relationships between other digital subjects (e.g., between humans and devices or documents or services)
De foto links is gemaakt tijdens de persconferentie van Privacy First in Nieuwspoort op 6 mei 2010: de dag dat de Nederlandse Staat door Privacy First werd gedagvaard in het Paspoortproces. Op de achtergrond ziet u vier van onze mede-eisers. Op de voorgrond rechts Privacy First voorzitter Bas Filippini, links Charles van der Hoog (Privacy First adviseur strategie).
Over de mede-eisers in het Paspoortproces heeft kunstfotograaf Maarten Tromp een prachtige fotoserie gemaakt. Twee van deze foto's treft u hieronder in klein formaat aan. Een groot aantal foto's verscheen op 2 februari 2011 in NRC Next. De gehele fotoserie is te zien op de website van Maarten Tromp.
© Maarten Tromp
Heuglijk nieuws van onze buren aan de andere kant van de Noordzee: vandaag is het Britse besluit ter afschaffing van ID-kaarten en een nationale biometriedatabase officieel in werking getreden. Dit gebeurde met één pennestreek van Koningin Elizabeth. De verantwoordelijke Britse Minister gaf de volgende toelichting: "De nationale ID-kaart was de overheid op z'n allerslechtst. Het was opdringerig, intimiderend, niet effectief en duur." Goed voorbeeld doet goed volgen. Wanneer volgt Nederland?
Update: meer over dit nieuwsbericht in Webwereld, NRC's 'Recht en Bestuur' en NRC Next.
Hieronder treft u een uitgebreide foto-impressie aan van de dag van het Paspoortproces in het Paleis van Justitie te Den Haag. De foto's zijn van persfotograaf Guus Schoonewille van Fastfoto en zijn vrij van rechten te gebruiken, mits met vermelding van "Stichting Privacy First, 29 nov. 2010, proces tegen de nieuwe Paspoortwet. Foto: Guus Schoonewille". Klik op de foto van uw keuze en dan verschijnt een grotere versie die u via de rechter muisknop kunt downloaden.
Wat volgt op vingerafdrukken? Sommige bedrijven zijn grote promotors van het gebruik van biometrie en bepaalde andere privacy-invasies. Ook het paspoort ontkomt er niet aan. Op 16 november in Milaan en 8 december jl. in Den Haag vond de grote lobby weer plaats. Lees HIER meer erover.
In het EU Parlement is gevraagd of de NL paspoortwet niet in strijd is met de EVRM.
Lees HIER meer over de vragen van Sophie in 't Velt.
WRR-publicatie nr. 46 van mr Vincent Böhre d.d. oktober 2010 zegt wetenschappelijk wat Privacy First altijd al gezegd heeft, namelijk dat de nieuwe paspoortwet broddelwerk is. De publicatie heet "Happy Landings? Het biometrische paspoort als zwarte doos". Download het WRR-document HIER en lees HIER wat de ambtenaren er zelf over zeggen. Privacy First krijgt onafgebroken soortgelijke reacties uit de samenleving.
Inmiddels zijn er Kamervragen over gesteld.
In september 2009 zond Veronica een filmpje uit over de verplichte opslag van vingerafdrukken voor een nieuw paspoort. Om de overheid een handje te helpen ging CQC-verslaggever Jelte bij de opening van het Utrechtse filmfestival alvast de vingerafdrukken van bekende Nederlanders verzamelen. Hij laat zien hoe gemakkelijk dat gaat.
INSTRUCTIE GEBRUIK MODELBRIEF GEMEENTEGARANTIE
Deze tekst hoort bij de Modelbrief Gemeentegarantie Vingerafdrukken in uw nieuwe paspoort of identiteitskaart. U kunt deze tekst veranderen naar eigen inzichten en wensen.
INSTRUCTIE GEBRUIK MODELBRIEF GEMEENTEGARANTIE
Deze instructie hoort bij de Modelbrief Gemeentegarantie voor een nieuw paspoort of identiteitskaart met vingerafdrukken.
Veel mensen hebben ons gevraagd wat te doen als ze geen vingerafdrukken willen afgeven maar toch een paspoort of identiteitskaart nodig hebben.
Op dit moment is daar geen oplossing voor.
Als u geen vingerafdrukken afgeeft om een paspoort of identiteitskaart te verkrijgen of te verlengen, heeft er officieel geen aanvraag plaatsgevonden en krijgt u geen paspoort. Met andere woorden, er is geen ambtelijke handeling of uitspraak geweest waartegen u gewoon bezwaar kunt maken.
Als u bezwaar wilt maken tegen het afgeven van vingerafdrukken in het algemeen loopt u tegen Europese Verordening 2252 d.d. 13 dec. 2004 Artikel 1 lid 2 op dat zegt dat er vingerafdrukken in het document moeten staan.
Wat overblijft is bezwaar maken tegen de elektronische opslag door de overheid van uw vingerafdrukken als u geen verdachte van de politie bent. De Verordening vraagt niet om lokale of centrale opslag. Het gaat er uitsluitend om dat iemand aan de hand van een paspoort kan worden geïdentificeerd. (Verordening (EG) nr. 2252/2004 van de Raad van de Europese Unie van 13 december 2004, artikelen 2 en 4.)
Wij voeren een ingewikkeld proces tegen De Staat tegen bovenstaande gang van zaken.
Stichting Privacy First heeft echter wel een manier bedacht om u als burger te helpen.
Een van de problemen met afgifte en opslag van uw vingerafdrukken (en andere biometrische gegevens) is in feite het gevaar van misbruik, het oneigenlijk gebruik en het onwettig gebruik. In gewone taal: dat er niet zorgvuldig mee wordt omgesprongen en dat u er nadeel van kunt ondervinden.
Welnu, u kunt bij wijze van spreken met gerust hart uw vingerafdrukken afgeven als u als individuele burger van de overheid een verklaring heeft die u beschermt tegen eventueel nadeel. Een soort verzekeringspolis dus. U vraagt hen simpelweg op papier te verklaren wat zij mondeling tegen u en de pers beweren en wat zij volgens de EU Verordening 2252, Artikel 1 lid 2 moeten doen, namelijk uw gegevens volkomen veilig te verwerken.
De nieuwe Paspoortwet bevat 23 'gaten'. Essentiële dingen staan er niet in geregeld. Bijvoorbeeld wie waarvoor verantwoordelijk is, of hoe u uw paspoortgegevens kunt corrigeren als die niet helemaal correct blijken te zijn (verplicht volgens de Verordening artikel 4.1) - om maar wat voorbeelden te noemen. Daardoor is het noodzakelijk dat u zo'n verklaring van de gemeente of staat heeft, in plaats van dat dit collectief per wet is geregeld voor heel Nederland.
Overigens is het zo dat als men u een nieuw paspoort geeft, u niet wordt gevraagd te verifiëren of de vingerafdrukken daarop wel de uwe zijn of wel voldoende met de uwe overeenkomen om aan de grens op vliegveld New York makkelijk te kunnen doorlopen – we noemen maar een voorbeeld. Toch heeft u er recht op dat na te gaan voordat u ermee op stap gaat. Dat staat in Artikel 4 lid 1 van genoemde Verordening. Het is interessant of de gemeentebalie u toestaat te kijken of het wel goed zit met die vingerafdrukken op uw paspoort.
Hieronder vindt u een tekst die u kunt gebruiken om een brief aan uw gemeente te schrijven. Het is prima als u uw eigen woorden ervoor gebruikt zolang de inhoud maar hetzelfde blijft.
Laat onze organisatie weten hoe het is gegaan.
Zend een kopie mee van gemeentepapieren die u ontvangt.
Doe het volgende:
- Neem de tekst over op uw eigen briefpapier of computer.
- Bewerk de tekst een beetje zodat het uw eigen brief wordt. Bijvoorbeeld door de brief iets anders te beginnen en er een of twee zinnen van uzelf aan toe te voegen als slot. S.v.p. geen emoties of ellenlange teksten eraan toevoegen. Dit is een soort verzekeringsbrief.
- Zet de juiste naam van de burgemeester of tekeningsbevoegde ambtenaar en het adres van de gemeente erboven.
- Zet uw naam eronder en onderteken de brief.
- Zorg ervoor dat uw adres erop staat zodat duidelijk is wie de afzender is.
- Maak twee kopieën van de brief.
- Onderteken de brief en onderteken een van de kopieën.
- Zet het woord "KOPIE" op de ondertekende kopie.
- Neem de adressering van de brief over op de envelop.
- Doe de brief en de ondertekende kopie in een envelop.
- Geef de envelop met de door u ondertekende brief en de door u ondertekende kopie af aan de gemeentebalie en krijg van degene die hem aanneemt een bewijs van ontvangst. Of verzend anders de envelop "aangetekend met bewijs van ontvangst".
- Zet op uw eigen kopie dat u het heeft verstuurd of afgeleverd, met de datum.
-- NB: deze actie is inmiddels vervangen door de GemeenteGarantieBrief 2.0 --
Als u moeite heeft met uw vingerafdrukken afgeven maar toch een nieuw paspoort of identiteitskaart nodig heeft, dan kunt u met onderstaande brief uzelf indekken tegen de eventuele gevolgen van hoe de overheid met uw gegevens is omgesprongen.
U kunt de GemeenteGarantieBrief voor eigen gebruik hier downloaden als PDF of als Word-document.
Bij de GemeenteGarantieBrief hoort een gebruiksinstructie. Klik HIER.
Uw gemeente is verplicht de GemeenteGarantiebrief op uw verzoek in ontvangst te nemen, aldus ook Nationale ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer. Zie ook het bericht hierover in de Telegraaf van 22 april 2010.
MODELBRIEF GEMEENTEGARANTIE VOOR NIEUW PASPOORT OF IDENTITEITSKAART MET VINGERAFDRUKKEN
Gemeente [naam van uw gemeente]
T.a.v. [naam van de burgemeester of tekenbevoegde vertegenwoordiger van de gemeente]
[Uw woonplaats], [Datum]
Geachte heer/mevrouw [naam van de burgemeester],
U of uw ambtenaar heeft aangegeven dat het op grond van de nieuwe Paspoortwet niet mogelijk is voor mij een paspoort en/of identiteitskaart aan te vragen zonder dat ik vier vingerafdrukken verstrek. Twee van deze vingerafdrukken zullen worden opgeslagen in een chip op het paspoort of de identiteitskaart. Op termijn zullen deze vier vingerafdrukken in een landelijke, centrale databank worden opgenomen.
Hierbij deel ik u mee bezwaar te maken tegen de afname van mijn vier vingerafdrukken en de opslag daarvan in een centrale databank. Bovendien maak ik bezwaar tegen het verstrekkingenregime dat zal gaan gelden ten aanzien van mijn vingerafdrukken.
Nut en noodzaak van deze maatregelen zijn niet aangetoond. De maatregelen gaan veel verder dan het doel dat de nieuwe Paspoortwet nastreeft, namelijk het bestrijden van paspoortfraude. Vingerafdrukken zijn zogenaamde biometrische gegevens, waaruit allerhande persoonlijke en vertrouwelijke informatie kan worden afgeleid. Voorheen werden alleen vingerafdrukken afgenomen van verdachten. Nu worden de vingerafdrukken van alle Nederlanders centraal opgeslagen. Deze centrale opslag leidt in feite tot een opsporingsregister, waaruit naar hartelust kan worden geput.
Deze gang van zaken vormt een ongeoorloofde beperking van mijn recht op bescherming van mijn persoonlijke levenssfeer. Meer specifiek zijn deze maatregelen in strijd met artikel 8 van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens, de Europese Privacyrichtlijn 95/46 en artikel 16 van het Verdrag betreffende het Functioneren van de Europese Unie. Naar mijn overtuiging is de nieuwe Paspoortwet in strijd met deze regelgeving.
Mijn vingerafdrukken verstrek ik dan ook onder protest daartoe gehouden te zijn.
Bovendien wijs ik u er hierbij op dat alle handelingen die door de gemeente ten aanzien van mijn vingerafdrukken worden verricht, moeten voldoen aan de regels van de Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens (“Wbp”).
Hierbij verzoek ik u door ondertekening van de deze brief te verklaren dat de gemeente kennis heeft genomen van mijn bezwaren en mijn vingerafdrukken alleen in overeenstemming met de Wbp zal verwerken. Dit houdt onder meer in dat de gemeente mijn vingerafdrukken:
- Op behoorlijke en zorgvuldige wijze zal verwerken;
- Niet verder zal verwerken op een wijze die onverenigbaar is met de doeleinden waarvoor de vingerafdrukken zijn verkregen (te weten het verstrekken van een paspoort en/of identiteitskaart);
- Niet aan derde partijen zal verstrekken zonder mijn uitdrukkelijke toestemming;
- Niet langer zal bewaren dan noodzakelijk is voor de verwerkelijking van de doeleinden waarvoor de vingerafdrukken worden verzameld of verwerkt (te weten het verstrekken van een paspoort en/of identiteitskaart); en
- Beveiligt tegen verlies of enige vorm van onrechtmatige verwerking door middel van passende technische en organisatorische maatregelen.
Graag ontvang ik de ondertekende brief uiterlijk vijf dagen na heden op het onderstaande adres.
Niets in deze brief mag verondersteld worden al een erkenning van het recht van de gemeente tot het verrichten van de hierboven beschreven handelingen met mijn vingerafdrukken. De inhoud van deze brief doet geen afbreuk aan mijn rechten, die alle worden voorbehouden. Graag wijs ik u er voorts op dat indien de gemeente mijn vingerafdrukken in strijd met de Wbp of anderszins onrechtmatig zal verwerken, de gemeente gehouden is de schade die ik hierdoor lijdt, te vergoeden.
Voor akkoord ondertekend
namens de gemeente,
Privacy First meent dat de ontdekking van Kim Cameron baanbrekend is en geeft daarom zijn artikel integraal weer. U kunt zijn website en blogs hier lezen.
The Internet was built without a way to know who and what you are connecting to. This limits what we can do with it and exposes us to growing dangers. If we do nothing, we will face rapidly proliferating episodes of theft and deception that will cumulatively erode public trust in the Internet.
This paper is about how we can prevent the loss of trust and go forward to give Internet users a deep sense of safety, privacy, and certainty about whom they are relating to in cyberspace. Nothing could be more essential if Web-based services and applications are to continue to move beyond “cyber publication” and encompass all kinds of interaction and services. Our approach has been to develop a formal understanding of the dynamics causing digital identity systems to succeed or fail in various contexts, expressed as the Laws of Identity. Taken together, these laws define a unifying identity metasystem that can offer the Internet the identity layer it so obviously requires.
The ideas presented here were extensively refined through the Blogosphere in a wide-ranging conversation documented at www.identityblog.com that crossed many of the conventional fault lines of the computer industry, and in various private communications. In particular I would like to thank Arun Nanda, Andre Durand, Bill Barnes, Carl Ellison, Caspar Bowden, Craig Burton, Dan Blum, Dave Kearns, Dave Winer, Dick Hardt, Doc Searls, Drummond Reed, Ellen McDermott, Eric Norlin, Esther Dyson, Fen Labalme, Identity Woman Kaliya, JC Cannon, James Kobielus, James Governor, Jamie Lewis, John Shewchuk, Luke Razzell, Marc Canter, Mark Wahl, Martin Taylor, Mike Jones, Phil Becker, Radovan Janocek, Ravi Pandya, Robert Scoble, Scott C. Lemon, Simon Davies, Stefan Brands, Stuart Kwan and William Heath.
The Internet was built without a way to know who and what you are connecting to.
A Patchwork of Identity “One-Offs”
Since this essential capability is missing, everyone offering an Internet service has had to come up with a workaround. It is fair to say that today’s Internet, absent a native identity layer, is based on a patchwork of identity one-offs.
As use of the Web increases, so does users’ exposure to these workarounds. Though no one is to blame, the result is pernicious. Hundreds of millions of people have been trained to accept anything any site wants to throw at them as being the “normal way” to conduct business online. They have been taught to type their names, secret passwords, and personal identifying information into almost any input form that appears on their screen.
There is no consistent and comprehensible framework allowing them to evaluate the authenticity of the sites they visit, and they don’t have a reliable way of knowing when they are disclosing private information to illegitimate parties. At the same time they lack a framework for controlling or even remembering the many different aspects of their digital existence.
Criminalization of the Internet
People have begun to use the Internet to manage and exchange things of progressively greater real-world value. This has not gone unnoticed by a criminal fringe that understands the ad hoc and vulnerable nature of the identity patchworkï¿½and how to subvert it. These criminal forces have increasingly professionalized and organized themselves internationally.
Individual consumers are tricked into releasing banking and other information through “phishing” schemes that take advantage of their inability to tell who they are dealing with. They are also induced to inadvertently install “spyware” which resides on their computers and harvests information in long term “pharming” attacks. Other schemes successfully target corporate, government, and educational databases with vast identity holdings, and succeed in stealing hundreds of thousands of identities in a single blow. Criminal organizations exist to acquire these identities and resell them to a new breed of innovators expert in using them to steal as much as possible in the shortest amount of time. The international character of these networks makes them increasingly difficult to penetrate and dismantle.
Phishing and pharming are now thought to be one of the fastest growing segments of the computer industry, with an annual compound growth rate (CAGR) of 1000%. (For example, the Anti-Phishing Working Group “Phishing Activity Trends Report” of February 2005 cites an annual monthly growth rate in phishing sites between July through February of 26% per month, which represents a compound annual growth rate of 1600%.) Without a significant change in how we do things, this trend will continue.
It is essential to look beyond the current situation, and understand that if the current dynamics continue unchecked, we are headed toward a deep crisis: the ad hoc nature of Internet identity cannot withstand the growing assault of professionalized attackers.
A deepening public crisis of this sort would mean the Internet would begin to lose credibility and acceptance for economic transactions when it should be gaining that acceptance. But in addition to the danger of slipping backwards, we need to understand the costs of not going forward. The absence of an identity layer is one of the key factors limiting the further settlement of cyberspace.
Further, the absence of a unifying and rational identity fabric will prevent us from reaping the benefits of Web services.
Web services have been designed to let us build robust, flexible, distributed systems that can deliver important new capabilities, and evolve in response to their environment. Such living services need to be loosely coupled and organic, breaking from the paradigm of rigid premeditation and hard wiring. But as long as digital identity remains a patchwork of ad hoc one-offs that must still be hard-wired, all the negotiation and composability we have achieved in other aspects of Web services will enable nothing new. Knowing who is connecting with what is a must for the next generation of cyber services to break out of the starting gate.
It’s Hard to Add an Identity Layer
There have been attempts to add more standardized digital identity services to the Internet. And there have been partial successes in specific domainsï¿½like the use of SSL to protect connections to public sites; or of Kerberos within enterprises. And recently, we have seen successful examples of federation in business-to-business identity sharing.
But these successes have done little to transform the identity patchwork into a rational fabric extending across the Internet.
Why is it so hard to create an identity layer for the Internet? Mainly because there is little agreement on what it should be and how it should be run. This lack of agreement arises because digital identity is related to context, and the Internet, while being a single technical framework, is experienced through a thousand kinds of content in at least as many different contextsï¿½all of which flourish on top of that underlying framework. The players involved in any one of these contexts want to control digital identity as it impacts them, in many cases wanting to prevent spillover from their context to any other.
Enterprises, for example, see their relationships with customers and employees as key assets, and are fiercely protective of them. It is unreasonable to expect them to restrict their own choices or give up control over how they create and represent their relationships digitally. Nor has any single approach arisen which might serve as an obvious motivation to do so. The differing contexts of discreet enterprises lead to a requirement that they be free to adopt different kinds of solutions. Even ad hoc identity one-offs are better than an identity framework that would be out of their control.
Governments too have found they have needs that distinguish them from other kinds of organization. And specific industry clustersï¿½”verticals” like the financial industryï¿½have come to see they have unique difficulties and aspirations when it comes to maintaining digital relationships with their customers.
As important as these institutions are, the individualï¿½as consumerï¿½gets the final say about any proposed cyber identity system. Anything they don’t like and won’tï¿½or can’tï¿½use will inevitably fail. Someone else will come along with an alternative.
Consumer fears about the safety of the Internet prevent many from using credit cards to make online purchases. Increasingly, malware and identity theft have made privacy issues of paramount concern to every Internet user. This has resulted in increased awareness and readiness to respond to larger privacy issues.
As the virtual world has evolved, privacy specialists have developed nuanced and well-reasoned analyses of identity from the point of view of the consumer and citizen. In response to their intervention, legal thinkers, government policy makers, and elected representatives have become increasingly aware of the many difficult privacy issues facing society as we settle cyberspace. This has already led to vendor sensitivity and government intervention, and more is to be expected.
In summary, as grave as the dangers of the current situation may be, the emergence of a single simplistic digital identity solution as a universal panacea is not realistic.
Even if a miracle occurred and the various players could work out some kind of broad cross-sector agreement about what constitutes perfection in one country, the probability of extending that universally across international borders would be zero.
An Identity Metasystem
In the case of digital identity, the diverse needs of many players demand that we weave a single identity fabric out of multiple constituent technologies. Although this might initially seem daunting, similar things have been done many times before as computing has evolved.
For instance, in the early days of personal computing, application builders had to be aware of what type of video display was in use, and of the specific characteristics of the storage devices that were installed. Over time, a layer of software emerged that was able to provide a set of services abstracted from the specificities of any given hardware. The technology of “device drivers” enabled interchangeable hardware to be plugged in as required. Hardware became “loosely coupled” to the computer, allowing it to evolve quickly since applications did not need to be rewritten to take advantage of new features.
The same can be said about the evolution of networking. At one time applications had to be aware of the specific network devices in use. Eventually the unifying technologies of sockets and TCP/IP emerged, able to work with many specific underlying systems (Token Ring, Ethernet, X.25 and Frame Relay)ï¿½and even with systems, like wireless, that were not yet invented.
Digital identity requires a similar approach. We need a unifying identity metasystem that can protect applications from the internal complexities of specific implementations and allow digital identity to become loosely coupled. This metasystem is in effect a system of systems that exposes a unified interface much like a device driver or network socket does. That allows one-offs to evolve towards standardized technologies that work within a metasystem framework without requiring the whole world to agree a priori.
Understanding the Obstacles
To restate our initial problem, the role of an identity metasystem is to provide a reliable way to establish who is connecting with whatï¿½anywhere on the Internet.
We have observed that various types of systems have successfully provided identification in specific contexts. Yet despite their success they have failed to attract usage in other scenarios. What factors explain these successes and failures? Moreover, what would be the characteristics of a solution that would work at Internet scale? In answering these questions, there is much to be learned from the successes and failures of various approaches since the 1970s.
This investigation has led to a set of ideas called the Laws of Identity. We chose the word “laws” in the scientific sense of hypotheses about the worldï¿½resulting from observationï¿½which can be tested and are thus disprovable. (We consciously avoided the words “proposition,” meaning something proven through logic rather than experiment, and “axiom,” meaning something self-evident.) The reader should bear in mind that we specifically did not want to denote legal or moral precepts, nor embark on a discussion of the “philosophy of identity.” (All three areas are of compelling interest, but it is necessary to tightly focus the current discussion on matters that are directly testable and applicable to solving the imminent crisis of the identity infrastructure.)
These laws enumerate the set of objective dynamics defining a digital identity metasystem capable of being widely enough accepted that it can serve as a backplane for distributed computing on an Internet scale. As such, each law ends up giving rise to an architectural principle guiding the construction of such a system.
Our goals are pragmatic. When we postulate the Law of User Control and Consent, for example, it is because experience tells us: a system that does not put users in control willï¿½immediately or over timeï¿½be rejected by enough of them that it cannot become and remain a unifying technology. How this law meshes with values is not the relevant issue.
Like the other laws, this one represents a contour limiting what an identity metasystem must look likeï¿½and must not look likeï¿½given the many social formations and cultures in which it must be able to operate. Understanding the laws can help eliminate a lot of doomed proposals before we waste too much time on them.
The laws are testable. They allow us to predict outcomes, and we have done so consistently since proposing them. They are also objective, i.e., they existed and operated before they were formulated. That is how the Law of Justifiable Parties, for example, can account for the successes and failures of the Microsoft Passport identity system.
The Laws of Identity, taken together, define the architecture of the Internet’s missing identity layer.
Many people have thought about identity, digital identities, personas, and representations. In proposing the laws we do not expect to close this discussion. However, in keeping with the pragmatic goals of this exercise we define a vocabulary that will allow the laws themselves to be understood.
What is a Digital Identity?
We will begin by defining a digital identity as a set of claims made by one digital subject about itself or another digital subject. We ask the reader to let us define what we mean by a digital subject and a set of claims before examining this further.
What Is a Digital Subject?
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines a subject as:
“A person or thing that is being discussed, described or dealt with.”
So we define a digital subject as:
“A person or thing represented or existing in the digital realm which is being described or dealt with.”
Much of the decision-making involved in distributed computing is the result of “dealing with” an initiator or requester. And it is worth pointing out that the digital world includes many subjects that need to be “dealt with” other than humans, including:
The OED goes on to define subject, in a philosophical sense, as the “central substance or core of a thing as opposed to its attributes.” As we shall see, “attributes” are the things expressed in claims, and the subject is the central substance thereby described.
(We have selected the word subject in preference to alternatives such as “entity,” which means “a thing with distinct and independent existence.” The independent existence of a thing is a moot point hereï¿½it may well be an aspect of something else. What matters is that a relying party is dealing with the thing and that claims are being made about it.)
What Is a Claim?
A claim is:
“An assertion of the truth of something, typically one which is disputed or in doubt.”
Some examples of claims in the digital realm will likely help:
- A claim could just convey an identifierï¿½for example, that the subject’s student number is 490-525, or that the subject’s Windows name is REDMOND\kcameron. This is the way many existing identity systems work.
- Another claim might assert that a subject knows a given keyï¿½and should be able to demonstrate this fact.
- A set of claims might convey personally identifying informationï¿½name, address, date of birth and citizenship, for example.
- A claim might simply propose that a subject is part of a certain groupï¿½for example, that she has an age less than 16.
- And a claim might state that a subject has a certain capabilityï¿½for example, to place orders up to a certain limit, or modify a given file.
The concept of “being in doubt” grasps the subtleties of a distributed world like the Internet. Claims need to be subject to evaluation by the party depending on them. The more our networks are federated and open to participation by many different subjects, the more obvious this becomes.
The use of the word claim is therefore more appropriate in a distributed and federated environment than alternate words such as “assertion,” which means “a confident and forceful statement of fact or belief.” (OED) In evolving from a closed domain model to an open, federated model, the situation is transformed into one where the party making an assertion and the party evaluating it may have a complex and even ambivalent relationship. In this context, assertions need always be subject to doubtï¿½not only doubt that they have been transmitted from the sender to the recipient intact, but also doubt that they are true, and doubt that they are even of relevance to the recipient.
Advantages of a Claims-Based Definition
The definition of digital identity employed here encompasses all the known digital identity systems and therefore allows us to begin to unify the rational elements of our patchwork conceptually. It allows us to define digital identity for a metasystem embracing multiple implementations and ways of doing things.
In proffering this definition, we recognize it does not jibe with some widely held beliefsï¿½for example, that within a given context, identities have to be unique. Many early systems were built with this assumption, and it is a critically useful assumption in many contexts. The only error is in thinking it is mandatory for all contexts.
By way of example, consider the relationship between a company like Microsoft and an analyst service that we will call Contoso Analytics. Let’s suppose Microsoft contracts with Contoso Analytics so anyone from Microsoft can read its reports on industry trends. Let’s suppose also that Microsoft doesn’t want Contoso Analytics to know exactly who at Microsoft has what interests or reads what reports.
In this scenario we actually do not want to employ unique individual identifiers as digital identities. Contoso Analytics still needs a way to ensure that only valid customers get to its reports. But in this example, digital identity would best be expressed by a very limited claimï¿½the claim that the digital subject currently accessing the site is a Microsoft employee. Our claims-based approach succeeds in this regard. It permits one digital subject (Microsoft Corporation) to assert things about another digital subject without using any unique identifier.
This definition of digital identity calls upon us to separate cleanly the presentation of claims from the provability of the link to a real world object.
Our definition leaves the evaluation of the usefulness (or the truthfulness or the trustworthiness) of the claim to the relying party. The truth and possible linkage is not in the claim, but results from the evaluation. If the evaluating party decides it should accept the claim being made, then this decision just represents a further claim about the subject, this time made by the evaluating party (it may or may not be conveyed further).
Evaluation of a digital identity thus results in a simple transform of what it starts withï¿½again producing in a set of claims made by one digital subject about another. Matters of trust, attribution, and usefulness can then be factored out and addressed at a higher layer in the system than the mechanism for expressing digital identity itself.
We can now look at the seven essential laws that explain the successes and failures of digital identity systems.
Technical identity systems must only reveal information identifying a user with the user’s consent. (Blogosphere discussion starts here…)
No one is as pivotal to the success of the identity metasystem as the individual who uses it. The system must first of all appeal by means of convenience and simplicity. But to endure, it must earn the user’s trust above all.
Earning this trust requires a holistic commitment. The system must be designed to put the user in controlï¿½of what digital identities are used, and what information is released.
The system must also protect the user against deception, verifying the identity of any parties who ask for information. Should the user decide to supply identity information, there must be no doubt that it goes to the right place. And the system needs mechanisms to make the user aware of the purposes for which any information is being collected.
The system must inform the user when he or she has selected an identity provider able to track Internet behavior.
Further, it must reinforce the sense that the user is in control regardless of context, rather than arbitrarily altering its contract with the user. This means being able to support user consent in enterprise as well as consumer environments. It is essential to retain the paradigm of consent even when refusal might break a company’s conditions of employment. This serves both to inform the employee and indemnify the employer.
The Law of User Control and Consent allows for the use of mechanisms whereby the metasystem remembers user decisions, and users may opt to have them applied automatically on subsequent occasions.
The solution that discloses the least amount of identifying information and best limits its use is the most stable long-term solution. (Starts here…)
We should build systems that employ identifying information on the basis that a breach is always possible. Such a breach represents a risk. To mitigate risk, it is best to acquire information only on a “need to know” basis, and to retain it only on a “need to retain” basis. By following these practices, we can ensure the least possible damage in the event of a breach.
At the same time, the value of identifying information decreases as the amount decreases. A system built with the principles of information minimalism is therefore a less attractive target for identity theft, reducing risk even further.
By limiting use to an explicit scenario (in conjunction with the use policy described in the Law of Control), the effectiveness of the “need to know” principle in reducing risk is further magnified. There is no longer the possibility of collecting and keeping information “just in case” it might one day be required.
The concept of “least identifying information” should be taken as meaning not only the fewest number of claims, but the information least likely to identify a given individual across multiple contexts. For example, if a scenario requires proof of being a certain age, then it is better to acquire and store the age category rather than the birth date. Date of birth is more likely, in association with other claims, to uniquely identify a subject, and so represents “more identifying information” which should be avoided if it is not needed.
In the same way, unique identifiers that can be reused in other contexts (for example, drivers’ license numbers, Social Security Numbers, and the like) represent “more identifying information” than unique special-purpose identifiers that do not cross context. In this sense, acquiring and storing a Social Security Number represents a much greater risk than assigning a randomly generated student or employee number.
Numerous identity catastrophes have occurred where this law has been broken.
We can also express the Law of Minimal Disclosure this way: aggregation of identifying information also aggregates risk. To minimize risk, minimize aggregation.
Digital identity systems must be designed so the disclosure of identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a given identity relationship. (Starts here…)
The identity system must make its user aware of the party or parties with whom she is interacting while sharing information.
The justification requirements apply both to the subject who is disclosing information and the relying party who depends on it. Our experience with Microsoft Passport is instructive in this regard. Internet users saw Passport as a convenient way to gain access to MSN sites, and those sites were happily using Passportï¿½to the tune of over a billion interactions per day. However, it did not make sense to most non-MSN sites for Microsoft to be involved in their customer relationships. Nor were users clamoring for a single Microsoft identity service to be aware of all their Internet activities. As a result, Passport failed in its mission of being an identity system for the Internet.
We will see many more examples of this law going forward. Today some governments are thinking of operating digital identity services. It makes sense (and is clearly justifiable) for people to use government-issued identities when doing business with the government. But it will be a cultural matter as to whether, for example, citizens agree it is “necessary and justifiable” for government identities to be used in controlling access to a family wikiï¿½or connecting a consumer to her hobby or vice.
The same issues will confront intermediaries building a trust fabric. The law is not intended to suggest limitations of what is possible, but rather to outline the dynamics of which we must be aware.
We know from the Law of Control and Consent that the system must be predictable and “translucent” in order to earn trust. But the user needs to understand whom she is dealing with for other reasons, as we will see in the Law of Human Integration. In the physical world we are able to judge a situation and decide what we want to disclose about ourselves. This has its analogy in digital justifiable parties.
Every party to disclosure must provide the disclosing party with a policy statement about information use. This policy should govern what happens to disclosed information. One can view this policy as defining “delegated rights” issued by the disclosing party.
Any use policy would allow all parties to cooperate with authorities in the case of criminal investigations. But this does not mean the state is party to the identity relationship. Of course, this should be made explicit in the policy under which information is shared.
A universal identity system must support both “omni-directional” identifiers for use by public entities and “unidirectional” identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles. (Starts here…)
Technical identity is always asserted with respect to some other identity or set of identities. To make an analogy with the physical world, we can say identity has direction, not just magnitude. One special “set of identities” is that of all other identities (the public). Other important sets exist (for example, the identities in an enterprise, an arbitrary domain, or a peer group).
Entities that are public can have identifiers that are invariant and well known. These public identifiers can be thought of as beaconsï¿½emitting identity to anyone who shows up. And beacons are “omni-directional” (they are willing to reveal their existence to the set of all other identities).
A corporate Web site with a well-known URL and public key certificate is a good example of such a public entity. There is no advantageï¿½in fact there is a great disadvantageï¿½in changing a public URL. It is fine for every visitor to the site to examine the public key certificate. It is equally acceptable for everyone to know the site is there: its existence is public.
A second example of such a public entity is a publicly visible device like a video projector. The device sits in a conference room in an enterprise. Visitors to the conference room can see the projector and it offers digital services by advertising itself to those who come near it. In the thinking outlined here, it has an omni-directional identity.
On the other hand, a consumer visiting a corporate Web site is able to use the identity beacon of that site to decide whether she wants to establish a relationship with it. Her system can then set up a “unidirectional” identity relation with the site by selecting an identifier for use with that site and no other. A unidirectional identity relation with a different site would involve fabricating a completely unrelated identifier. Because of this, there is no correlation handle emitted that can be shared between sites to assemble profile activities and preferences into super-dossiers.
When a computer user enters a conference room equipped with the projector described above, its omni-directional identity beacon could be utilized to decide (as per the Law of Control) whether she wants to interact with it. If she does, a short-lived unidirectional identity relation could be established between the computer and the projectorï¿½providing a secure connection while divulging the least possible identifying information in accordance with the law of minimal disclosure.
Bluetooth and other wireless technologies have not so far conformed to the Law of Directed Identity. They use public beacons for private entities. This explains the consumer backlash innovators in these areas are currently wrestling with.
Public key certificates have the same problem when used to identify individuals in contexts where privacy is an issue. It may be more than coincidental that certificates have so far been widely used when in conformance with this law (i.e., in identifying public Web sites) and generally ignored when it comes to identifying private individuals.
Another example involves the proposed usage of RFID technology in passports and student tracking applications. RFID devices currently emit an omni-directional public beacon. This is not appropriate for use by private individuals.
Passport readers are public devices and therefore should employ an omni-directional beacon. But passports should only respond to trusted readers. They should not be emitting signals to any eavesdropper that identify their bearers and peg them as nationals of a given country. Examples have been given of unmanned devices that could be detonated by these beacons. In California we are already seeing the first legislative measures being taken to correct abuse of identity directionality. It shows a failure of vision among technologists that legislators understand these issues before we do.
A universal identity system must channel and enable the inter-working of multiple identity technologies run by multiple identity providers. (Starts here…)
It would be nice if there were one way to express identity. But the numerous contexts in which identity is required won’t allow it.
One reason there will never be a single, centralized monolithic system (the opposite of a metasystem) is because the characteristics that would make any system ideal in one context will disqualify it in another.
It makes sense to employ a government issued digital identity when interacting with government services (a single overall identity neither implies nor prevents correlation of identifiers between individual government departments).
But in many cultures, employers and employees would not feel comfortable using government identifiers to log in at work. A government identifier might be used to convey taxation information; it might even be required when a person is first offered employment. But the context of employment is sufficiently autonomous that it warrants its own identity, free from daily observation via a government-run technology.
Customers and individuals browsing the Web meanwhile will in many cases want higher levels of privacy than is likely to be provided by any employer.
So when it comes to digital identity, it is not only a matter of having identity providers run by different parties (including individuals themselves), but of having identity systems that offer different (and potentially contradictory) features.
A universal system must embrace differentiation, while recognizing that each of us is simultaneouslyï¿½and in different contextsï¿½a citizen, an employee, a customer, and a virtual persona.
This demonstrates, from yet another angle, that different identity systems must exist in a metasystem. It implies we need a simple encapsulating protocol (a way of agreeing on and transporting things). We also need a way to surface information through a unified user experience that allows individuals and organizations to select appropriate identity providers and features as they go about their daily activities.
The universal identity metasystem must not be another monolith. It must be polycentric (federation implies this) and also polymorphic (existing in different forms). This will allow the identity ecology to emerge, evolve, and self-organize.
Systems like RSS and HTML are powerful because they carry any content. We need to see that identity itself will have severalï¿½perhaps manyï¿½contexts, and yet can be expressed in a metasystem.
The universal identity metasystem must define the human user to be a component of the distributed system integrated through unambiguous human-machine communication mechanisms offering protection against identity attacks. (Starts here…)
We have done a pretty good job of securing the channel between Web servers and browsers through the use of cryptographyï¿½a channel that might extend for thousands of miles. But we have failed to adequately protect the two or three foot channel between the browser’s display and the brain of the human who uses it. This immeasurably shorter channel is the one under attack from phishers and pharmers.
No wonder. What identities is the user dealing with as she navigates the Web? How understandably is identity information conveyed to her? Do our digital identity systems interface with users in ways that objective studies have shown to work? Identity information currently takes the form of certificates. Do studies show certificates are meaningful to users?
What exactly are we doing? Whatever it is, we’ve got to do it better: the identity system must extend to and integrate the human user.
Carl Ellison and his colleagues have coined the term ‘ceremony’ to describe interactions that span a mixed network of human and cybernetic system componentsï¿½the full channel from Web server to human brain. A ceremony goes beyond cyber protocols to ensure the integrity of communication with the user.
This concept calls for profoundly changing the user’s experience so it becomes predictable and unambiguous enough to allow for informed decisions.
Since the identity system has to work on all platforms, it must be safe on all platforms. The properties that lead to its safety can’t be based on obscurity or the fact that the underlying platform or software is unknown or has a small adoption.
One example is United Airlines’ Channel 9. It carries a live conversation between the cockpit of one’s plane and air traffic control. The conversation on this channel is very important, technical, and focused. Participants don’t “chat”ï¿½all parties know precisely what to expect from the tower and the airplane. As a result, even though there is a lot of radio noise and static, it is easy for the pilot and controller to pick out the exact content of the communication. When things go wrong, the broken predictability of the channel marks the urgency of the situation and draws upon every human faculty to understand and respond to the danger. The limited semiotics of the channel mean there is very high reliability in communications.
We require the same kind of bounded and highly predictable ceremony for the exchange of identity information. A ceremony is not a “whatever feels good” sort of thing. It is predetermined.
But isn’t this limitation of possibilities at odds with our ideas about computing? Haven’t many advances in computing come about through ambiguity and unintended consequences that would be ruled out in the austere light of ceremony?
These are valid questions. But we definitely don’t want unintended consequences when figuring out who we are talking to or what personal identification information to reveal.
The question is how to achieve very high levels of reliability in the communication between the system and its human users. In large part, this can be measured objectively through user testing.
The unifying identity metasystem must guarantee its users a simple, consistent experience while enabling separation of contexts through multiple operators and technologies.
Let’s project ourselves into a future where we have a number of contextual identity choices. For example:
- Browsing: a self-asserted identity for exploring the Web (giving away no real data)
- Personal: a self-asserted identity for sites with which I want an ongoing but private relationship (including my name and a long-term e-mail address)
- Community: a public identity for collaborating with others
- Professional: a public identity for collaborating issued by my employer
- Credit card: an identity issued by my financial institution
- Citizen: an identity issued by my government
We can expect that different individuals will have different combinations of these digital identities, as well as others.
To make this possible, we must “thingify” digital identitiesï¿½make them into “things” the user can see on the desktop, add and delete, select and share. (We have chosen to “localize” the more venerable word “reify”.) How usable would today’s computers be had we not invented icons and lists that consistently represent folders and documents? We must do the same with digital identities.
What type of digital identity is acceptable in a given context? The properties of potential candidates will be specified by the Web service from which a user wants to obtain a service. Matching thingified digital identities can then be displayed to the user, who can select between them and use them to understand what information is being requested. This allows the user to control what is released.
Different relying parties will require different kinds of digital identities. And two things are clear:
- A single relying party will often want to accept more than one kind of identity, and
- A user will want to understand his or her options and select the best identity for the context
Putting all the laws together, we can see that the request, selection, and proffering of identity information must be done such that the channel between the parties is safe. The user experience must also prevent ambiguity in the user’s consent, and understanding of the parties involved and their proposed uses. These options need to be consistent and clear. Consistency across contexts is required for this to be done in a way that communicates unambiguously with the human system components.
As users, we need to see our various identities as part of an integrated world that nonetheless respects our need for independent contexts.
Those of us who work on or with identity systems need to obey the Laws of Identity. Otherwise, we create a wake of reinforcing side effects that eventually undermine all resulting technology. The result is similar to what would happen if civil engineers were to flaunt the law of gravity. By following them we can build a unifying identity metasystem that is universally accepted and enduring.
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